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JURISDICTION OF THE ORPHANS' COURT
R. M. REMICK*
To the practitioner in the Orphans' Court, whether active or casual, nothing
is of more importance than an accurate knowledge of the scope, or conversely,
the limits, of its jurisdiction.
From the founding of the province by the Royal Charter of Charles II,
March 4, 1682, such jurisdiction has been in effect.' Originally the Court was
referred to as the "Court of Orphans," but'in all subsequent Acts under its
present title "Orphans' Court." 3
As was said by Mr. Justice Sergeant: 4
"It is probable, that both the name and jurisdiction of this court
were borrowed from the Court of Orphans of the city of London,
*Member of the Philadelphia Bar; practiced exclusively in the Orphans' Court since 1918;
author of PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT PRACTICE.
1in the Charter it was provided:
"And our further will and pleasure is, that the Lawes for regulateing and governing of
Propertie. within the said Province, as well for the descent and enjoyment of lands, as
likewise for the enjoyment and succession of goods and Chattells, and likewise as to felonies,
shall bee and continue the Same as they shall bee for the time being, by the general course
of the Law in our Kingdome of England, untill the said Lawes shall be altered by the said
William Penn, his heires or assignes, and by the freemen of the said Province, their Dele2 gates or Deputies, or the greater part of them.'
1n the 188th law passed in May, 1688 cited in 3 Sm. L. 134.
3As was said by the late Judge Gest of Philadelphia County in Feil's Adoption, 6 D. & C. 529,
in referring to adoption cases:
"'Notwithstanding its name, the Orphans' Court is not a court of orphans or a children's
court or a court of domestic relations, as some may ignorantly suppose. It has nothing to do
with children as such. It deals with the estates of decedents and the fiduciaries entrusted
with them and the estates of minors and their guardians. It is an estate court, or better,
a fiduciaries' court; its proper province is the contest of wills and their construction, the
settlement of decedents' estates and the appointment, supervision and control of fiduciaries
and the like subjects. When this court appoints guardians for minor children it establishes
a fiduciary relation, but the care of minors and the supervision of their welfare are foreign
to our duties.
"It should be remarked that it has been the policy of this Commonwealth from colonial
days to limit the functions of this court to the settlement of estates and the control and
appointment of fiduciaries. The specialization thereby afforded to the court has enabled it
the better and more expeditiously to distribute estates among creditors, heirs and legatees.
Every one in the State eventually becomes either a decedcnt, heir, legatee or creditor, and,
hence, it is of the utmost importance to the whole community that the work of this court
should be handled with accuracy and expedition rather than that there should be added to its

functions the granting of petitions for adoption; a jurisdiction very foreign to the specialization mapped out by the public policy of this Commonwealth.

"Furthermore, the importance of maintaining this specializativn will be the better appreciated when it is remembered that all the vast assets in this State, potentially pass through
this court every generation."
4In Wimmer's App., 1 Wh. 95, 102 (1835).
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which had th-e care and guardianship of children of deceased citizens of London, in their minority, and could compel executors to
file inventories, and give security for their estates."
Prior to 1832 "the beginnings of the Orphans' Court were very feeble."'
Ithad been noted: 6
"Nothing so much requires legislative attention as the proceedings in the Orphans' Courts, for as sure as we descend into our
graves so sure into this court we must come; and the man would be
a real public benefactor who would devise set .forms and furnish directions in conducting the vast business in these courts, where every
day we find so deplorable a system of confusion."
To remedy this situation the Legislature in 18307 authorized the Governor
to appoint three persons as Commissioners "to revise, collate and digest all such
public acts and statutes of the civil code of this State and all such British Statutes
in force in this State as are general and permanent in their nature." These
Commissioners subsequently reported a large number of draft acts, five of
which, relating to our present subject, were substantially adopted by the Legislature. 8
The codifiers of 1830:
"felt very sensibly the difficulties of their task. 'The peculiar
structure of the court,' say they, 'its extensive but ill-defined sphere
of jurisdiction, the magnitude of the interests upon which it operates, the uncertainty of the code of law by which it is regulated,
and its equally uncertain and insufficient practice and process, serve
to surround with difficulties every attempt to frame a regular system for it.' -9
5

Wimmer's App., 1 Wh. 95, 102 (1835).
"In the early period of the Orphans' Court in this state, it occupied a low place in
the judicial system; and even in the first quarter of this century, its decrees could be set
aside collaterally." Agnew, J. in Mussleman's App., 65 Pa. 480, 4R5.
6By Judge Duncan in 1824 in McPherson v. Cunliffe, It S. & R. 422. With respect to this
decision it was said in 1870;
"It was not until the able and exhaustive opinion of Judge Duncan, delivered in
1824 in McPherson v. Cunliff, of 11 S. & R. 422, which settled the proper position
of the Orphans' Court, that it reached its true dignity, and the way was prepared
for the revision of the Orphans' Court system, its jurisdiction, powers and practice, con.
tained in the Acts of 29th March 1832, 24th of February 1834, and 16th of June
1836. Under these laws, the Orphans' Court came up to the full measure of a court of
record, standing upon an equality with the others. At first, the true extent of the work was
not perceived, especially by those who disliked to unlearn what they knew, and who took
with difficulty to a new system. But its powers have grown clearer to the professional vis10n, and its utility increased in appreciation." Agnew, J. in Mussleman's App., 65 Pa. 480,
485.
7
By joint Resolution No. 9 of March 23, 1830 (P. L. 408).
In accordance with this resolution the then Governor, the Honorable George Wolf, appointed William Rawle, Thomas I. Wharton and Joel Jones as such Commissioners.
8These were: The Act of March 15, 1832, P. L. 135, entitled An Act Relating to Registers
and Registers' Courts; the Act of March 29, 1832, P. L. 190, entitled an Act Relating to Orphans'
Courts; the Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 249, entitled An Act Relating to Last Wills and Testaments; the Act of April 8, 1833, P. L. 315, entitled An Act Relating to the Descent and Distribution of the Estates of Intestates, and the Act of February 24, 1834, P.L. 70, entitled An Act
Relating
to Executors and Administrators. See Report of 1915 Commissioners, p. 1.
9
Woodward, J. in Homer v. Hasbrouck, 41 Pa. 169, 178 (1861). And see 51 York 33.
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By their work, after a hundred and fifty years order was created out of
chaos.
The acts then adopted with more than two hundred others amendatory
thereof or supplementary thereto served for over eighty years as the basis of our
law of decedents' estates and kindred subjects until in 1917 there were passed
the acts now in force. These were the culmination of the work of a Commission appointed by the Governor in 1915.10
Since its inception the Orphans' Court 11 has been denominated a "Court
of Record" with "all the qualities and incidents of a court of record at common
law."12
Its jurisdiction, however, is "limited by the terms of the statutes""3 by which
14
it was created and under which it continues to function.
" 'It is possessed of chancery powers, and can proceed, according to chancery practice . . .in the administration of its appropriate duties.' But, while in this sense the orphans' court is
a court of equity, the limitations upon its chancery powers are
clearly marked. 'The chancery jurisdiction is the model, and contains the principles most congenial to this institution, and the legislature have in very many instances sanctioned and enjoined the
application of these principles to proceedings in th'e orphans'
court ...The orphans' court is sometimes called a court of limited jurisdiction. This is true, if regard be had to the derivation
of its powers, for it possesses none inherently, and exercises such
only as are conferred by or implied from legislation; and it is true
also as to the rubjects of its jurisdiction, for these are set down
in the statutes.' "Is
This viewpoint has been even more strongly and clearly expressed: 16
"Although the orphans' court has been called a court of
equity, in respect to the few subjects within its jurisdiction, the
ancillary powers of such a court have not been given to it. It is
a special tribunal for specific cases; and its resemblance to a court
of equity consists in its practice of proceeding by petition and
10(P. L. 177) consisting of the late Judge John Marshall Gest, George E. Alter, Esq., and
the Hon. Thomas J. Baldrige, now of the Superior Court.

IlAct of March 27, 1713, 1 Sin. L. 81, Sec. 1.
2
1 Act of March 29, 1832, P.L. 190, Sec. 1,which was re-enacted in the present Orphans' Court

Act of 1917, P. L. 363, Sec. 2. Jones' Est., 28 D. & C. 657, 659 (Lackawanna Co.).

lajones' Est., 28 D. & C.'657, 659.
14"Any warrant for its action must be found in the language of the statutes which create and
define its powers". Mains' Est., 322 Pa. 243, 246, citing Willard's App., 65 Pa. 265 and Weyand
v. Weller, 39 Pa. 443.

16Shollenberger's App., 21 Pa. 337, 340. A flagrant case of an attempt to broaden such juris-

diction is illustrated in Mains' Est., 322 Pa. 243 where the court said (p. 247):
"A casual reading of this petition discloses that what petitioner seeks is a discovery,
an accounting, a declaration of rights of various parties and, as accessory thereto, a determination of many and varied conflicting facts. To these may be added orders for reconvey-

ances and the avoidance of outstanding deeds to land.

One would search in vain for any

grant of such power to the orphans' court in the statutes of this State.

The relief sought

can be granted only by a court of full equitable powers, and we cannot include within the
jurisdiction of the orphans' court what has hitherto been conceded to be without."
1&Brinker v. Brinker, 7 Pa. 53, 55.

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

answer containing the substance, but not the technical subtleties
and nice distinctions of a bill in equity; by which, however, justice is obtained more conveniently and as certainly as in courts
of equity, purely so-called . .. The orphans' court . . . has not
the general powers of a court of equity ..."
"and in Anderson's Law Dictionary, 815, a 'probate court' is defined as, 'A court exercising jurisdiction over the estates of deceased
persons, possessing, as to personal assets, nearly all the powers
formerly exercised by the courts of chancery and the Ecclesiastical
Courts of England . . . Other names are "orphans" and "surrogate" courts.' "17
All this shows very clearly that "the orphans' court, within the sphere of
its jurisdiction, is a court of equity"' 8 and "has all the powers of a court of
equity."1 9
The numerous decisions to this effect are buttressed by the very terms of
the Act of Assembly2 which provides:
"The supreme and superior courts of this commonwealth shall,
in all cases of appeal from the definitive sentence or decree of the
orphans' court, hear, try and determine the same as to right and
justice may belong, and decree according to the equity thereof;
and may refer the same to auditors when, in their discretion, they
may think proper."
Equity courts "decide in each case as equity and good conscience require,
so that exact justice, as nearly as this is possible in human affairs, may be done
to all parties in interest. This, indeed, is said to be the justification for the existence of such courts.''21
In truth it may be added that this phase of practice so often emphasized
and applied by both lower and appellate courts affords one of the most gratifying elements in the treatment of such litigation as may fall within its province.
Proceeding from the general to the specific, it is to be noted that the original jurisdiction of the orphans' court is now based on one of four 22 fundamental facts, that is, the death of a person, the minority of a ward, the creation of
a trust by deed inter vivos, and the adoption of on'e person by another. In the
case of a decedent the jurisdiction attaches at the moment of death, subject only
purely within the scope of the jurisdiction and power
to such matters as may be
2
of the register of wills. 3
All matters relating to jurisdiction are now embodied in the Orphans'
7

1 Power v. Grogan, 232 Pa. 387, 396.
'sLonergan's Est., 303 Pa. 142, 147.

l 9 Nimlet's Est., 299 Pa. 359, 368.
20Sec. 22 (b) of the Orphans' Court Act of 1917, P.L. 363 based on the Acts of April 14,
1835,2 P.L. 275, Sec. 4, and June 16, 1836, P.L. 683, Sec. 2.

1Lonergan's Est., 303 Pa. 142, 147.
Five if there be included proceedings for delayed birth registration under the Acts of July 16,
1941, P.L. 383 and 405.
ZIAs to which see Register of Wills Act of 1917, P.L. 415.
22
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and particularly Section 9 thereof which provides:
whether sep"The jurisdiction of the several orphans' courts,
25
arate or otherwise, shall extend to and embrace:
"(a) The appointment,, control, removal and discharge of
27
the guardians of minors,2 6 and the settlement of their accounts."
The next succeeding section of the act was recommended by the Commissioners as being declaratory of the existing law. It relates to
"The appointment 28 of trustees for any persons interested in
the real or personal estate of any decedent, and the control, removal,2 9 discharge 30 and settlement of the accounts 31 of trustees so
appointed and of testamentary trustees, whether the testamentary
trustees be appointed nominatim or virtule ojficii."
Under Section 15 of the Act of June 14, 1836, P.L. 628, it had been held
that the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
Orphans' Court in all cases of testamentary trusts where the fiduciary powers
were conferred upon trustees nomninatim.3 This act so far as it related to testamentary trustees was repealed'" and it has now been specifically provided that:
"All trustees who are subject to the jurisdiction of the Orphans' court shall file their accounts in the court appointing them
or, in the case of testamentary trustees, in the orphans' court of the
county where the will is or shall be probated. The orphans' court
shall have 'exclusive jurisdiction of the accounts of all trustees appointed by such court, and of all testamentary trustees, whether
Court Act of

191724

24P.L. 363.
5Such jurisdiction once acquired and exercised will not be divested by subsequent legislation,
unless such a result is required by the words of the statute. Patterson's Est., 89 P.L.J. 169, 41 D.
& C. 136.
26The provisions of the Act are amplified in Section 59 of the Fiduciaries Act, This jurisdiction is in most instances exclusive in the Orphans' Court of the county in which the minor resides
when the guardian is first appointed. Mintzer's Est., 13 Pa. C.C. 465, 2 Dist. 584. Residence
governs, not domicile but "when an infant has no parent the law remits him to his domicile of
origin." Id.and see Jacoby's Est., 47 Pa. C.C. 183, 28 Dist. 7.
Such jurisdiction is exclusive. Lewis v. Browning, 111 Pa. 493. But it exists only as to
acts occurring during minority. Evans' Est., 11 Pa. C.C. 324, 1 Dist. 453. It does not apply to
"non-resident alien dependents" who take under the Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736. Pawelezyk's
Est., 75 P.L.J. 881. And see Dolan v. Pitts. Coal Co., 66 P.L.J. 241, 27 Dist. 877. The Orphans'
Court of the county in which a testamentary guardian is domiciled has jurisdiction to require him
to account no matter where the will was probated. Rively's Est., 7 Del. 522.
27As to this the Commissioners of 1915 said:
"This and most of the following clauses of this section are founded upon Section 19
of the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 792, 3 Purd. 3362-9. The changes and additions are noted
under the particular clauses.
"Section 19 of the Act of 1836 supplied Section 4 of the Act of March 29, 1832, P.L.
190, and enlarged the jurisdiction there given.
"In the present clause, the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of May 19, 1874, P.L.
207, 3 Purd. 3369, have been incorporated, omitting, however, the reference to 'registers'
courts.' "
2-SFor procedure, see Sec. 56 of Fiduciaries Act.
9For procedure, see Sec. 53 of Fiduciaries Act.
3OFor procedure, see Sec. 52 of Fiduciaries Act.
procedure, see Sec. 46 of Fiduciaries Act.
3SIFor
2
See Wilson v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 324 Pa. 545, 549, and 20 P.S. Pg. 361, n. 9.
83
By Sec. 63 of the Fiduciaries Act.
2
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such trusts are vested in executors or administrators virtute officii or
in trustees named in the will." 34
decedent was a resident, few if any questions have arisen.
the
Where
Where, however, the decedent was a non-resident and his will was originally
probated in another state or county, differences of opinion have arisen.
Some courts have refused to audit such accounts because of lack of jurisdiction;26 others36 have accepted jurisdiction where no party in interest objected and
there were no peculiar circumstances precluding an authoritative and binding disposition of the questions involved. This would seem to be the more proper
ruling under the general theory that a court having jurisdiction to compel a
trustee to account has equal jurisdiction over an account filed by such a fiduciary
voluntarily.
Seemingly the clause in the present act saving jurisdiction to the Court of
Common Pleas applied only to cases where accounts had been filed in that court
and were still pending when th'e new act was passed. Hence the Orphans'
Court has taken jurisdiction of a subsequent account. where a prior account
had been filed in the Common Pleas and the audit thereof long since completed.
In 187937 a new sphere of jurisdiction was opened to the Orphans' Court
in the appointment of trustees for persons "absent from his or her usual place
of abode ....for the space of one year" whose whereabouts have been unknown
during such period. This act was construed by our Supreme Court in 1885:38
"The appointment of a trustee, durante absentia, imports no
more than that the fact has been made known to the court, in the
form and manner prescribed by law, that the alleged absentee has
been absent from his usual place of abode, that his whereabouts
have not been known for a period of at least one year, and that he
has left an estate, without any person to take charge of it. It
adjudicates nothing as to his being alive or dead, for that is precisely what is not known, and nothing as to his estate; it makes no
provision for notice, and is therefore a proceeding purely ex parte
in its character. Although alleged to have an estate, the absentee
may, in fact, have none; those who claim adversely are not made
parties, and cannot therefore be concluded by the decree. Whether
or not he has an estate may, as in this case, depend upon the date
of his death. He may therefore be fairly supposed to have an estate when he has none, to be alive when he is dead, or dead when,
in fact, he is alive. The proceeding is therefore wholly under the
control and direction of the court, and the final disposition of the
34

By Sec. 46 (g) of the Fiduciaries Act with a clause saving jurisdiction to the Common

Pleas: "in cases of trustees who have filed their accounts in such courts before the approval of this

act, and cases of substituted testamentary trustees appointed by any court
the approval of this act."
35
See Stahler's Est., 55 Montg. 229.
36See Hess Est. (York Co.) 19 Dist. 52; Boothroyd's Est., (Phila.
see generally Martin v. Martin, 214 Pa. 389; Musselman's App., 10 Pa.
37By the Act of April 11, 1879, P.L. 21, amended by Act of March
88Esterly's App., 109 Pa. 222.

of common pleas before

Co.) 23 Dist. 712. And
165.
30, 1905, P.L. 77.
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trust estate must, of necessity, depend upon the development of the
truth as to the cause of the absence."
As against any prior acts the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court was held
to be exclusive 9 and a bill against such a trustee for an accounting in the Common Pleas did not lie.
This act was a forerunner of subsequent legislation4O relating to procedure
in the Orphans' Court with refertence to the estates of presumed decedents.
An administrator appointed after procedure under these latter acts has the
right to take in distribution as against a trustee durante absentia appointed under
the Act of 1879.41
Jurisdiction was continued by the Act of 1917:
"The appointment of trustees for absent persons, the control,
removal and discharge of trustees so appointed, and the settlement of their accounts."
And in conformity therewith the prior statutes were re-enacted but with
42
slight changes.
So far no confusion had arisen.
However, the same Legislature forty days later"3 and without any reference
to its former enactment conferred almost precisely similar jurisdiction upon the
Court of Common Pleas.
Each act leaves something to be desired. The first does not specifically
empower the trustee to make sale of real estate. The latter covers only residents
of this state. One of the acts should be properly amended in which case the
other should be repealed.
To the writer it would seem that procedure in the Orphans' Court would be
more compatible with the existing law, as that court already, under Section 6
of the Fiduciaries Act, has complete jurisdiction of all matters connected with
the estates of presumed decedents, and apparently the theory of the Legislature
covering the appointment of a trustee durante absentia is to take in this period
of six years which elapses between the one year's disappearance and the seven
years after which a decree of presumed death can be entered. Having jurisdiction of the one, it should assume that of the other.
The succeeding clause of the act is almost literally a re-enactment of prior
statutory provisions relating to 44
"The control, removal4 5 and discharge', of executors and adreministrators, d'eriving their authority from the register
47 of the
spective county and the settlement of their accounts."
3SJones v. Lerch, 18 Dist. 1059 (Berks Co.).
40Acts of June 24, 1885, P.L. 155 and May 28, 1913, P.L. 369 now embodied in Sec. 6 of
Act of 1917.
the Fiduciaries
4

1Ziegler's
Est., 25 Pa. C.C. 611 (Lancaster Co.).
2
4 In Sec. 60 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917.
4

3By the Act of July 17, 1917,
44As provided under clause (p)
45
For procedure, see Sec. 53 of
46For procedure, see Sec. 52 of

P.L. 1033.
of this Section of the Act as amended.
the Fiduciaries Act.
the Fiduciaries Act.

47For procedure, see Sec. 46-7-8 of the Fiduciaries Act.
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Despite this clear and unequivocal language, numerous attempts were made
prior to the present law 4 8 to interfere by suits at law or in equity with the settlement of decedents' estates over which the Orphans' Court had exclusive jurisdiction and supervision. As against prior statutes, the importance of the present
act is the addition of the word "control":
"But, whatever may have been the situation prior to 1917, it cannot now be doubted that the Orphans' Court has full jurisdiction
to control an executor. 'The word "control" in clause (d), section 9, is new; it was not in statutes relating to or defining the
jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court in force prior to 1917, and if,
prior to 1917, there was any doubt as to the power of that court,
that doubt is now completely removed. And, since it is a word
conferring jurisdiction, it must be given its widest meaning, embracing not only the power to restrain but also the power to direct
acts.4"9
Intimately connected with the settlement of accounts is" 0
"The distribution 5' of the assets and surplusage of the estates
54
of decedents 2 among creditors" and others interested:
Except for the omission of certain unimportant words this is a re-enactment of the existing law. 5'
Most often, however, has there arisen the question as to which of several
courts has jurisdiction over "assets" that are in dispute. How is it to be dertrmined whether certain bonds, stocks, bank accounts, items of furniture and
the like really belonged to the decedent when he died, or on the other hand, to
another? While both parties to the controversy are living, the remedy is apt,
either by replevin in the Court of Common Pleas or through the instrumentality
of a bill in equity. Is such remedy changed or such jurisdiction ousted by the
death of one of the parties? Innumerable questions have been raised on this
point in one court or the other, and thereunder there has arisen most frequently
in the first instance the question as to which court has jurisdiction,
The underlying principles applied in the answer to such questions seem
clearly to indicate that the criterion is, was the property in question in the possession or control of the decedent at the time of his death either actually or by
necessary inference as a matter of law,"6 or is the person in possession or control
48

Sec. 9 (d)

49
50 Kelley

of the Orphans' Court Act of 1917.

v. McGurl, 27 Sch. 209, 13 D. & C. 350, and cases there cited.
As provided in clause (e) of Sec. 9 of the Orphans' Court Act.
SlAs provided under Sec. 49-50-51 of the Fiduciaries Act.
62The court cannot settle disputes between living persons. Walkinshaw's Est., ii
55
As to the distinction between the respective jurisdictions of the Common Pleas and
Court see DeLisio's Est., 24 D. & C. 169 and cases there cited.
So far as actually making claim is concerned its jurisdiction is concurrent. Ohio
Tr. Co. 137 Pa. Super. 75.
54Either under the Intestate Act of 1917, P.L. 429 or the Wills Act, P.L. 403.
55
Clause IIIof Sec. 19 of the Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 784.
5
6McGovern's Est., 322 Pa. 379; Cutler's Est., 225 Pa. 167; Cooper's Est., 263 Pa.

West. 1.
Orphans'
v. Union

37.
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58
of such asset subject to the process of the court?57 In such case jurisdiction
59
Otherwise it is in the Common Pleas. 60
is clearly in the Orphans' Court.
In Keyser's Estate, 1 our Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Maxey, analyzed the previous decisions, and summarized the applicable principles governing the jurisdiction of the orphans' court where title to personal
property is in dispute; saying: "(1) The preliminary question for consideration
is where the possession of the disputed property was at the time of the decedent's death and thereafter, up to the time of hearing. (2) If the property
was in the decedent's possession, either actually or presumptively, at the time of
his death, or thereafter at any time came into the possession of his personal representative, as part of the estate for purposes of administration and ultimate distribution, the jurisdiction of the orphans' court attaches and it may decree or
award the disposition thereof, subject to the procedural rule next to be stated.
(3) If upon a hearing it so appears, yet a substantial dispute as to title or ownership is shown to exist between the rival claimants, the orphans' court has no
power to try and determine this question, but may submit the issue to the court
of common pleasrla for a trial by jury, under the power conferred by the Act
of June 7, 1917, P.L. 363, sec. 21 (a); the verdict so found, where certified
to the orphans' court, may then become the basis of a decree by that court settling the controversy. (4) If, however, the property in dispute was not in decedent's possession at the time of his death, and did not thereafter come into
the hands of his personal representative, the orphans' court is without power to
determine title or ownership disputed by a third party claiming the property as
his own. In such case the executor or administrator must bring an action at6 law
2
or in equity in the court of common pleas against the party in possession."
The asset having been in the possession of the decedent at the time of his
death, the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court is exclusive regardless of who subsequently may hold it.63 Its authority is complete and it may make any orders,
64
necessary to
either affirmative or negative (as in the nature of injunctions)
accomplish the proper disposition of the case and distribution of the subject
65
matter.
"Its process is plastic, and its power is only limited by the necessities of the case, and by its duty to administer equity in accordance
7
5 Mauser v. Mauser, 326 Pa. 257; Slagle's Est., 335 Pa. 552.
58Under Sections 9 (e) and (p) of the Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 363 as amended.
v. Rittenhouse, 186 Pa. 137, 142; See Slagle's Est., 335 Pa. 552, 559.
69Tyson
6

OFirst Nat. Bank &c. v. Getty, 118 Pa. Super. 326.

61329 Pa. 514, 518.

6laNow, probably, by a jury of its own under the Act of July 1, 1937, P.L. 2665.
2
6 Taken from Smith's Est., 141 Pa. Super. 571. See also Adams' Est., 139 Pa. Super. 512;
Moyer's Est., 341 Pa. 402; Brown's Est., 343 Pa. 230; Landis v. Landis, 343 Pa. 252 and particu.
lady Crisswell's Est., 334 Pa. 266.
68Mauser v. Mauser, 326 Pa. 257.
64Under Sec. 16 of the Orphans' Court Act of 1917.
65McGovern's Est., 322 Pa. 379; Cutler's Est., 225 Pa. 167; Tyson v. Rittenhouse, 186 Pa. 137,
Main's Est., 322 Pa. 243.
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with established 6rules.
finish its work.""

In such case it needs no other court to

The next five clauses in the Act relite to matters involving either in whole
or in part, real estate or the title thereto.
The first affects only executors aind administrators and provides for:
"(f) The sale of real estate of decedents for payment of their
debts:"67

This provision has no reference to and is separate and apart from the jurisdiction of the court over sales made in the exercise of a testamentary power."
To cover other situations relating to real estate, the Commission recommended and the Legislature passed the next two clauses:
"(g) The disposition of the title to real estate of decedents
and of persons disabled from dealing therewith in order to render
the same freely alienable and productive to the -living owners
thereof.""9
Jurisdiction as between the several courts is clearly set forth in th'e provis70
ions of the Revised Price Act:
"The orphans' court, in all cases where real estate, or a ground
rent issuing thereout, shall be or shall have been acquired by descent or last will, partly by deed and partly by descent or last will,
or by purchase by a trustee, executor or guardian, and in all other
cases the court of common pleas of each county of this commonwealth, shall have jurisdiction with respect to real estate situate
within the county, and in the cases hereinafter specified, to authorize or confirm"
the various transactions thereupon outlined at length in the cases specifically
thereafter referred to. 71
"(h) The partition of the real estate of decedents among
GGMarx, P.J. in Barbey's Est., 33 Berks 159, 162, 41 D. & C. 109.
7
O Sec. 9 of the Orphans' Court Act of 1917, which is an amendment of Clause IV of Section
19 of the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 792, 3 Purd. 3366 (o-w), which reads, "The sale of real

estates of decedents." Other sales than those for payment of debts are covered by clauses (g)
and (h).
For procedure, see Sec. 16 of the Fiduciaries Act which
is based on Sec. 20 of the Act
of Febiuary 24, 1834, P.L. 670 and Sec. 21 of the Act of April 19, 1794, 3 Sun. L. 143.
6eAs to which, see Sec. 28 of the Fiduciaries Act.
6
9lntroduced to cover the provisions of the Revised Price Act of 1917, P.L. 388 which re.
enacted with certain modifications the old Price Act of April 18, 1853, P.L. 503, which was drafted
in great part by the late Eli Kirk Price, Esq. for the Commission appointed for the purpose by the
Act of May 4, 1852, P.L. 638. As to the old Act it has been said: "The design of this act was
to facilitate the transmission of titles, to make real property available for commercial and business
uses, to encourage and promote improvement, and thereby to stimulate trade and develop the resources of the state; and it has no reference to or necessary connection with the administration of
decedents' estates: Spencer v. Jennings, 123 Pa. 184. The object of the act is not to settle questions
of title, but to transmit a title unincumbered by contingent or other interests: Hower's App., 55
Pa. 337."
7
t0n Sec. 1.

71ln Sec. 2, as amended.
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real estate, and
the parties entitled thereto, the valuation of such
72
the sale thereof for the purpose of distribution."
Jurisdiction is, however, concurrent with that of the Common Pleas73 as
the Partition Act7 4 provides:
"The orphans' court of each county of this commonwealth
shall have jurisdiction, but not exclusive jurisdiction, in the partition and valuation of real estate, within the county, of any decedent, testate or intestate, whether such decedent was at the time
of his death seized or possessed of such real estate solely or as
tenant in common or joint owner with any other person or persons,
and whether or not the surviving spouse of such decedent shall
elect to take against his or her will, and notwithstanding th'ere
may be a limitation of an estate or interest in the premises or some
part thereof, to a person or persons not in existence; and several
undivided interests in any premises, derived from different ancestors by descent or devise, may be parted or valued in one proceeding in said court: Provided, That such court shall not have such
jurisdiction during the continuance of any life estate in the whole
of such real estate."
Jurisdiction is also conferred to bring about:
"(i) The specific execution of contracts mad'e by decedents
to sell and convey any real estate of which such decedent shall die
of contracts made by decedents to purchasle any real
seised, and
75
estate:"
over all contracts, generally, but
This does not give the court jurisdiction
6
is limited to those affecting real estare.1
Once acquired, however, such jurisdiction covers all powers necessary to
carry out the actual contract including the incidental power of reformation of
72

Introduced to cover the provisions of the Orphans' Court Partition Act of 1917, P.L. 337

into which the Commission gathered, modified and harmonized the numerous and complicated provisions of the former statutes.
73"Both the orphans' court and the common pleas have jurisdiction to entertain partition proceedings, and where two actions are brought in different courts, the one which first acquires control
of the controversy will retain it to the exclusion of the other." Doyle's Est., 291 Pa. 263.
"As the petitioner herself has selected the court of common pleas, in equity, to partition the real estate, and as this equity proceeding is still pending and undetermined, the
orphans' court may not act upon any matter which is the subject of that proceeding. In the
orphans' court, where a partition fund is properly before the court for distribution, that
tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions necessary thereto. Dickinson's
Est., 148 Pa. 142. The court of common pleas, in equity, having assumed jurisdiction in
entertaining the partition suit, will dispose of the entire controversy, including the relief
now sought by the petitioner." Celenza's Est., 17 D. & C. 319. However, no jurisdiction
can be given to the court by agreement of the parties if it does not as a matter of law actually
have jurisdiction. Garvey's Est., 37 Lack. 7.
74
1n Sec. I of the Act of 1917. By the amendment of June 24, 1939, P.L. 707 the above
provisions were extended to include "the interests of the heirs of a deceased co-tenant and of the
surviving co-tenant."
75This is Clause VI of Section 19 of the Act of 1836, amended so as to include contracts for
the purchase of real estate.
334 Pa. 180, rev'g. 46 Lanc. 147.
Such jurisdiction is exclusive. Mellinger's Est.,
For procedure, see Sec. 18 of the Fiduciaries Act.
76
Birkel's Est.,
25 North. 191.
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the contract in suit.7 7 But where equitable rights of others are concerned which
require the exercise of broad powers of jurisdiction beyond the limited powers
of equity of the Orphans' Court which are confined entirely by statute, the Or78
phans' Court has no jurisdiction.
Proceedings for the collection or enforcement of pay"(j)
ment or delivery of all legacies,79 whether pecuniary,80 specific or
otherwise, and whether charged on real estate or not."
As to this, under the old act, it was said:"1
"The exclusiveness of its jurisdiction and the conclusiveness
of its decrees have been placed, by the Acts of Assembly and the
decisions of this court, upon a foundation which cannot be shaken.
If there be anything besides death which is not to be doubted it
is that the Orphans' Court alone has authority to ascertain the
amount of a decedent's property and order its distribution among
entitled to it."
those
82
And later:
"The result of the authorities seems to be that as to the
claims of distributees and legatees that jurisdiction of the Orphans'
Court is exclusive and that of the Common Pleas is ousted, while
as to creditors, the right to proceed by a common law action for
the determination of their claims is concurrent with the right to
proceed in the Orphans' Court. But in order to obtain any part
of the fund in the hands of the executor or administrator they
must proceed in the Orphans' Court which alone has the power
to distribute the estate."
To cover branches of jurisdiction under the new Fiduciaries Act, the Commissioners recommended and the Legislature enacted a provision covering:
"(k) Proceedings for the discharge of real estate of decedents from the lien of debts 3 of decedents, and for the discharge
of real and personal estate from the liens of legacies, annuities,84
77

Mellinger's Fst., 334 Pa. 180, rev'g. 46 Lanc. 147.
It has control over the lien of judgments against such real estate and of his unsecured
Eppley's Pet'n (No. 2), 54 York 122.
debts. Emig's Est.,
7
"1Baker's Est.,
21 Wash. 37.
As was said in this case by Hughes, P.J. specially presiding: "'This petition and the prayers
which accompanied it are of a character which can be addressed only to a court having
complete and plenary equity jurisdiction, and wa find nothing in the acts of assembly which
confer such on the orphans' court or which give it authority to proceed in the manner
requested. While that court is often characterized as having the powers of a court of
equity, nevertheless, these do not extend beyond the subjects which the court isauthorized
by statute to handle in the first instance."
"This does not confer jurisdiction of cases arising between a legatee and a stranger to the
estate. Spangler's Est., 11 D. & C. 79,
8OThis is Clause VII of Section 19 of the Act of 1836, extended so as to cover specific legacies
and legacies charged on land.
For procedure as to real estate, see Sec. 25 of the Fiduciaries Act.
Such jurisdiction is exclusive. Stapler et al. v. Atkinson, 27 Dist. 995, and Sec. 24
of Fiduciaries Act.
81By Black, C.J. in Whiteside v. Whiteside, 20 Pa. 473, 474.
2
S
By Green, J. in Phillips v. Allegheny Valley RR Co., 107 Pa. 465, 470.
8
3For procedure, see Secs. 15 and 16 of Fiduciaries Act.
84
For procedure, see Secs. 26-27 of Fiduciaries Act.
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dower, recognizances and other charges." 8
One of the broadest provisions of the Act was a verbatim re-enactment of
8
prior legislation: 6
"(1)
All cases within their respective counties, wherein executors, administrators, guardians or trustees may be possessed of
or are in any way accountable for any real or personal estate of a
decedent."
It will be noted that this covers all fiduciaries amenable to the Orphans'
Court; all assets, real or personal, of an estate and those not only in their possession but for which they may be accountable, and finally all cases which may
87
arise concerning them. "Language could not be broader."
It is not strange that this clause of the statute has been one of those most
frequently applied where real questions of jurisdiction have arisen.
Whatever doubt there might have been as to the exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court over testamentary trustees88 was finally settled
in 1936. There then arose in Philadelphia County a question as to the right
of a member of the Board of City Trusts which has control over charitable
trusts whose charge or administration is vested in the City89 to compel the submission of their records for inspection, examination and audit. Many testamentary trusts were involved (particularly that under the will of Stephen Girard)
and in a few cases (about one-third of one per cent. in amount) trusts inter
vivos.
There was a question as to which court had jurisdiction and in fact whether
any court could grant the prayer for reli'ef on the facts averred.
The court decided in no uncertain terms that it had authority to see to it
that relief should be granted, and said: 90
"By common law, statutes and, to a certain extent, the Constitution, the field of jurisdiction has been built within the orphan's
court over trust estates created by will. There should be no
divided authority or power, as it weakens the ultimate object
to be attained and one court alone should be responsible.
No other court or body should be permitted to intermeddle
with their control unless it be by express, definite and positive
enactment by the legislature. As has been stated, the power of
the orphans' court has grown extensively, modelled after a court
85

For procedure, see Sec. 27 of Fiduciaries Act.
86Clause
VIII of Sec. 19 of the Act of 1S36.
7
888 Penrose, J. in Horowitz Est., 20 Pa. C.C. 616.
1n Brown's Appeal, 12 Pa. 333 where doubt was caused by the language used in the 15th
Section of the Act of June 14, 1836, the court said (P.336):

"The object of the Act was to give

power to the Common Pleas and not take itfrom the Orphans' Court," And later (p. 338):
"The difference between a trust given nominatim and ratione officii to executors, is a nice
and subtle one, and hardly ever apparent to common scriveners, or to men who make theit

89

own wills inops concilii. It is for the interest of society that there should be one tribunal
to which parties can resort without being perplexed with such abstruse distinctions. And
such, we think, upon deliberate review, was the intent of the legislature."
Under the Act of June 30, 1869, P.L. 1276.

90

1n Wilson v. Board of City Trusts, 324 Pa. 545.
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of chancery with similar means to regulate and enforce its decrees
and orders. Within its appointed sphere the jurisdiction of the
orphans' court is complete and exclusive. It continues as long as
the trust res is administered by the trustee, and ends when that
res is delivered to the beneficiary or the ones entitled thereto by
will.
'Having settled the problem as to what court has control as
to all trusts created by will, we next consider trusts inter vivos.
Such trusts were within the exclusive control of the court of common pleas until the Act of June 26, 1931, P.L. 1384, amending
Section 9 of the Act of 1917, P.L. 363. Two paragraphs were
added to Section 9, increasing the jurisdiction of the orphans'
court: (n), which gave control over the accounts of trusts inter
vivos; (0), the control of life insurance trusts. We held that the
purpose of these sections was to create concurrent jurisdiction in the
orphans' court and common pleas over trusts inter vivos. As to
these trusts the court assuming jurisdiction has control and jurisdiction may be lodged in either court. All trusts created by wills
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the orphans' court and trusts
inter vivos may fall -within the jurisdiction of the two courts."
Acting under its "broad powers under the Act of 1836 to modify, reverse
and amend decrees, as well as pursuant to the Act of 1722, 1 Sm. L., Sec. 13,
conferring the powers of the Court of King's Bench" it transferred the entire
record to the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County with appropriate orders
for the issuance of process to accomplish the desired result. The case is still
pending there.
It would serve but unduly to prolong treatment of this subject to consider
all of the manifold"1 cases that have arisen and been decided under this section
of the Act, interesting though many of them are.
As declaratory of the existing law, the Commissioners suggested and the
Legislature adopted a clause covering:
"(m)
All appeals from the orders or decrees of the register
of wills9 2 of their respective counties, and all proceedings removed
from said registers by certification." 93
Prior to September 1, 1931, jurisdiction over trusts inter vivos was exclusively in the Court of Common Pleas. 9' By an Act of Assembly 5 effective as
of that date there were added two additional clauses to the Orphans' Court Act
extending jurisdiction to:
"(n)
The control, removal, discharge, and settlement of
accounts of trustees of trusts inter vivos;
"(o) The control, removal, discharge, and settlement of accounts of trustees of life insurance trusts, whether taking effect
91See 20 P.S. Sec. 2252 and Vol. 3 old Purdon's Digest 3368-9.
02As provided under Sec. 20 (d) and Sec. 21 of the Register of Wills Act of 1917, P.L. 415.
9
3As provided under Sees. 8 and 18 of the same Act.
94
Wilson v. Board of City Trusts, 324 Pa. 545, 552.
9
5Act of June 26, 1931, P.L. 1384.

DICKINSON LAII" REVIEW'

15

during the lifetime or at or after the death of the insured or settlor."
The new act contained no clause repealing prior legislation and it was
ktherefore held that the jurisdiction of the two courts was concurrent and whichever first acquired jurisdiction retained it to the exclusion of the other. 9
The right to control gave the right to construe or reform if necessary
without requiring the parties to resort to a bill in equity in the Common
Pleas; 97 also, in the case of fraud and the like to revoke. 98
The right of removal was not extended so as to apply to directors of a
charitable corporation organized as directed under the provisions of a will
99
where no actual trust was established.
Nor does it confer advisory jurisdiction over such a corporation or its
1
board of directors.
Its scope has been strictly limited.
"The expression 'trust inter vivos' is capable of including all
kinds of trusts except those created by testament. But when we
read the words in the light of the history of our jurisdiction we
cannot believe that this expression was meant to give to this court
concurrent jurisdiction with the common pleas over the whole
subject of nontestamentary trusts. The orphans' court has special
experience in dealing with the problems that arise under wills;
and deeds of trust, which are coming more and more into use,
present much the same problems. Whether our jurisdiction is to
be confined to trusts arising by deed or other written instrument
inter vivos, it is not necessary to decide. We do think, however,
that such jurisdiction is not to be extended to trusts which arise
by operation of law."'
In comparing the new act with the former3 the qualifying phrase "inter
vivos," was found to be controlling:
"From this it may well be reasoned that, when the Act of
1931 added the qualifying words 'inter vivos,' it was thereby intended to limit the concurrent jurisdiction conferred, to such trusts
only as might be identified as 'inter vivos trusts.' That jurisdiction over all nontestamentary trusts was not intended to be granted would appear also from the fact that the amending Act of
1931 by separate paragraph (o) gives jurisdiction in express terms
over 'The control, removal, discharge, and settlement of accounts
of trustees of life insurance trusts, whether taking effect during
the lifetime or at or after the death of the insured or settlor; . .'
Had the legislature by subdivision (n) intended to cover all types
of nontestamentary trusts such separate provision for life insurance
trusts would have been unnecessary.
96Breyer's Est., 19 D. & C. 255; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 316 Pa. 318; Roseberry's Est., 317
Pa. 45.7
9 Comly's Est., 16 D. & C. 336.
98
Goldstein's Est., 29 D. & C. 536; Kenin's Est., 41 D. & C. 572, aff'd. in 343 Pa. 549.
99
Watson's Est., 314 Pa. 179.
11n re Wanamaker Institute, 36 D. & C. 406.
2Shaffer's Est., 21 D. & C. 90; In re Stief, 32 D. & C. 289.

SThat of June 16, 1936, P.L. 784, Sec. 13.
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"What then is meant by the term 'trusts inter vivos'? In in
re Trust of Bailey and Regar, 29 D. & C. 215, at page 218, Judgo
Stearne of this court said, 'the term "inter vivos" is a Latin exzpression meaning "between living persons,"' and continues
'Whether or not the wording of the act as quoted is broad enough
to include trusts set up by other than individuals, i.e. corporations,
partnership firms, trade associations, etc. . .' was a question which
he deemed unnecessary to decide in that case. In Reading National Bank & Trust Company's Account, 22 D. & C. 654, Judge
Marx of the Berks County Orphans' Court expresses the opinion
that the purpose of the amending Act of 1931, extending jurisdiction of the orphans' court to include 'trusts inter vivos,' was to
give that tribunal jurisdiction over all dispositions of property in
trust, whether by will effective at death or by agreement or deed
effective in the donor's lifetime, since both forms of disposition
are subject to the same rules of interpretation and construction and
normally give rise to the same problems. He then held it did not
confer jurisdiction over the account of the trustee for the holders
of bonds secured by an individual's mortgage.
"All the decisions of this court that have so far construed the
amendment of 1931 have respected, even though they have not
clearly defined, the limitation imposed by the phrase 'trusts inter
vivos.' 4
"The orphans' courts of other counties have indicated a likc
disinclination to extend the amendment of 1931 beyond its express
terms, and have refused to take jurisdiction."' ,
It is not required that the trust be in writing.6
The same rule follows as in testamentary trusts that while unlimited within its scope the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court is confined to what is ex7
pressly given by the statute or necessarily implied.
But few questions have arisen as to territorial jurisdiction in the case of
testamentary trusts. As to residents it is always in the county where the will is
probated. Under deeds of trust inter vivos, however, the situation differs materially. Quite frequently the settlor resides in an entirely different place from
4
t Ladner,

J. in Smith's Petition, 43 D. & C. 154, 157.
In the following cases: Miller's Est., 19 D. & C. 141 (Lancaster Co.) agency created by
letter of attorney; Leinenbach's Petition, 24 D. & C. 433 (Schuylkill Co.) and Musser's Account,
39 D. & C. 475 (Lancaster Co.), assignments for benefit of creditors; Sullivan's Petition
34 D. & C. 154 (Berks Co.), agreement transferring to a trust company styled 'trustee
agent and attorney' a participation mortgage and defining the respective rights and powers
of the parties in interest: Alleged Trust Inter Vivos of Jernigan et al., 55 Montg. 231,
deposit of money in escrow against default in a husband's bond given to support the wife.
While it is true that jurisdiction was taken by the Berks County Orphans' Court in Keppelman's
Est., 27 Berks 299, for the purpose of appointing a substituted trustee of a mortgage pool, this was
apparently done only because the orphans' court already had jurisdiction of the trust res in that
the trustee was also fiduciary of many trust estates (under the jurisdiction of the court) whose
funds were invested in that particular mortgage pool.
Glf sufficiently proved by parol testimony. Tober's Est., 82 P.L.J. 91.
'7Keppelman's Est., supra.
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that of the trustee. In such case it is the court of the county where the trustee
resides, or, if a corporation, has its place of business, that has jurisdiction.8
In passing from the specific to the general, the Commissioners concluded
their "outline of jurisdiction" by providing:
"The exercise of all other powers needful to the doing of
anything which is or may be hereafter required or permitted to be
done in said court, whether incidental to the powers hereinbefore
enumerated or in addition thereto.
"And such jurisdiction shall be exercised under the limitations, and in the manner provided by law." 9
This would seem to dispel any lingering doubt either as to the breadth or
dieoth of the powers of the court once it has properly acquired jurisdiction in
Any proceeding brought before it.
While almost entirely ungermane to the jurisdiction of the Orphans'
8

As held by Gearhart, P.J. in Cassone's Est,, 14 Leh. 175, 19 D. & C. 272, where he said:
"itwill be observed that section 9 of the Orphans' Court Act is merely an outline of
the jurisdiction conferred. The details are supplied by the Fiduciaries Act and cognate
legislation. The Act of 1931 outlines the jurisdiction of the orphans' court with reference
to trusts inter vivos and life insurance trusts, but nowhere, so far as we are able to discover,
is there legislation supplying the details as to how, when, and where this new jurisdiction
is to be exercised.
"A search of the reports has not revealed an instance where our courts have passed
on the matter."
"There is no general rule controlling 'territorial jurisdiction' in the orphans' court;
sometimes the residence of an interested party controls. Section 59 (a) of the Fiduciaries
Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 447 provides that: 'The orphans' court of each county shall have
the care of the persons of minors resident within said county, and of their estates .... and
to appoint guardians for such as are under the age of fourteen or otherwise incompetent
to make choice for themselves. Such appointment or admission of a guardian, by the orphans'
court of the county in which the minor resides, shall have the like effect in every other
county in this Commonwealth as in that by the orphans' court of which he shall have been
so admitted or appointed.'
"In other cases, the situs of the property controls. Section 27 (a) of the Fiduciaries
Act provides in part: 'In all cases in which, under any proceeding in any orphans' court
• . . any dower, legacy . . . shall have been imposed upon land . . . it shall be lawful
for the owner of the land charged to apply by petition to the orphans' court of the county
where said land is situated,--or, in case said land is divided by a county line, to the orphans'
court of the county where the mansion-house may be situated; or, if there be no mansionhouse, in the county where the principal improvements may be; or, if there be no improvements, in either county . . .' and in still other cases varying factors are taken into consideration.
"Many sections of the Fiduciaries Act, the Revised Price Act, the Orphans' Court Partition Act, and kindred acts might be cited to illustrate the point. In short, cognate legislation supplies the details as to the manner in which jurisdiction is conferred on the orphans'
court by section 9 of the Orphans' Court Act of 1917, with the single exception of the
amendatory provision of the Act of 1931, amending section 9 so as to create jurisdiction

in the orphans' court over trusts inter vivos and insurance trusts.

The amendatory act

stands alone, and is open to conjecture as to when and how the jurisdiction of the orphans'

court is to be employed. The glaring defects of the act are strikingly pointed out in a wellconsidered article by J. Garfield Houston, Esq., 79 Pitts. L.J. 12 (a),"
9Originally clause (n) now (p) of Sec. 9 of the Act, as to which the Commissioners said:
"The first sentence of this clause is new, and is intended to remove any doubt as to
the interpretation of this section when compared with the language of the other acts relating
to the specific branches of the jurisdiction, and to obviate the necessity of amending this
section in case of any future grant of new jurisdiction to the court."
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Court,10 the Legislature"' further burdened that court with proceedings in adoption cases relating either to minors or adults.
The residence of the petitioner who is "desirous of adopting any person"
governs with respect to the court having jurisdiction thereof.' 2
As enlarging the court's powers but not extending them'" and in line with
the efforts of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, our own Legislature adopted and passed 14 the "Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act."' 15
Though not mentioned by name' 6 the Orphans' Court is given express andi
primary jurisdiction:
"(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatee5,
heirs, next of kin, or others; or
"(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to
do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
"(c) To determine any question arising in the administration
of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of willti
and other writings."
Rarely, indeed, has any act caused more controversy in the courts, both nisi
prius and appellate. This has not been over the question as to which court has
jurisdiction, 17 but, admitting the right, would the court assume it?
"In all jurisdictions where declaratory judgment practice obtains, the rule is established that it is a matter of judicial discretion
10Gest, J. in Feil's Adp'n, 6 D. & C. 529.
"1By the Act of April 4, 1925, P.L. 127.
laSuch jurisdiction is concurrent, at least as respects Philadelphia County, with that of the
Municipal Couit. McCann's Adp'n., 104 Pa. Super. 196.
Act repealed as respects Counties of the first
class by Act of June 5, 1941, P,L. 93.
13Frederick's Est., 19 Berks 529, 10 D. & C. 591.
4
1 June 18, 1923, P.L. 840; amended by Act of April 25, 1935, P.L. 72; supplemented by Act
of May 2, 1935, P.L. 228.
15The Act is constitutional. Kariher's Pet'n. (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455.
16Sec. I provides:
"Section 1. Scope.-Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that
a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative
or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree.
7
1 Held to be in Common Pleas in Kariher's Pet'n. (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455.
Keller, P.J. in Long et al. v. Uhl, et al., 8 D. & C. 671 (Centre County), decided that
a proceeding under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act where plaintiff claimed under
a deed or deeds, the Common Pleas, rather than the Orphans' Court, had jurisdiction, although the case involved the proper construction of a will.
Hirt, J., in Nagle's Est., 8 Erie 225, 9 D. & C. 392, (Erie County), held that the
Orphans' Court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of a post-nuptial agreement
between decedent and his wife, where the agieement is in no way involved in the distribution of the estate or other matter over which the court has jurisdiction.
Reno, P.J. in Heist v. Citizens Tr. Co., Gdn., 12 Leh. 333, held that only the Common
Pleas had jurisdiction to enforce a contract inter vivos and dismissed the petition for the
further reason that all proper parties had not been joined.
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whether or not jurisdiction will be taken of any particular
case * * * 18

While it has been said that
"Procedure by declaratory judgment is peculiarly appropriate
to the orphans' court, vested as it is with supervisory powers over
the administration of decedents' estates,"' 9
in very few cases has jurisdiction been assumed.2 0 In many more it has been
declined.?'
In less than a year after its passage, the first case 22 to arise under the Act
in Philadelphia County came before the Orphans' Court of that jurisdiction on
a petition to determine the validity of a lease which depended upon whether or
not a testamentary power of appointment had been properly exercised. It fell
to the lot of the late Judge Gest to write the opinion for the court en banc.
That learned jurist in determining that jurisdiction should not be assumed outlined his own ideas of the statute in no uncertain words:
"The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is an innovation
lSMoschzisker, C. J. in Kariher's Pet'n. (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455.
Pa. 386.
2lOCryan's Est., 301
01n Snavely's Est., 4 D. & C. 405 (Dauph. Co.) effect of widow's election.

In List's Est., (Butler Co) those entitled to corpus of residuary estate. Reversed on
the merits in 283 Pa, 255: "Thcie was no necessity for resorting (to the statute),-it should
not have been employed."
In Merten's Est., 15 Erie 379, title to a piano.
In Morris v. Morris, 13 D. & C. 634 (Greene Co.) and Johnson's Est., 15 D. & C.
347 (Crawford Co.) as a matter of practical help.
In Senft's Pet'n., 44 York 177, 15 D. & C. 792,-right of inheritance by an adopted
child.
In Fletcher's Est., 103 Pa. Super. 69 (Allegheny Co.)-interest in real estate.
In Musser's Est., 47 Lane. 239-sufficiency of election to take a devise.
Zln Duff's Est., 4 D. & C. 314 (Phila. Co.)-validity of a lease dependent upon proper
exercise of testamentary power of appointment..
In Brumagin's Pet'n., 6 Erie 192, 6 D. & C. 431-ascertainment of title acquired by
a devisee,
In Schoen's Pet'n., 20 Sch. 142, 21 Sch. 304, 6 D. & C. 256-construction of a codicil,
defective notice to parties.
In Wilhelm's Est., 19 North. 378-construction of will with respect to a power of
consumption.

In Follweiller's Est., 11 Leh. 198, 6 D. & C. 757-construction of a residuary bequest
as properly determinable at audit of executor's account,
In Lichty's Est., 39 Lane. 327-construction of a will.
In Freeman's Est., 7 D. & C. 289 (Phila. Co.)-by a professional trustee for aid and
advice with respect to its duties.
In Sedor's Est., 24 Luz. 167-for construction of a will.
In Dempsey's Est., 288 Pa. 458; Myers' Est., 10 D. & C. 291; Hume's Est., 24 D. & C.
73; Moore's Est., 14 Erie 190, 18 D. & C. 37; Jones' Est., 30 Berks 159;-all on the point
that the matter at issue could properly be decided by an account and audit.
In Straus' Est., 16 D. & C. 231 (Phila. Co.) (aff'd. in 307 Pa. 454) ; Sterrett's Est.,
300 Pa. 116; Stoey's Est., 34 Dauph. 63; Capital Bk. & Tr. Co.'s Pet'n., 336 Pa. 108 (Dauph.
Co.) ; Lochrie's Est., 340 Pa. 145 (Somerset Co.)-future rights involved.
In Laughlin's Est., 103 Pa. Super. 409 (afig. 14 D. & C. 670, Phila. Co.) ; Bergman
v. Gross, 329 Pa. 67 (Crawford Co.) ; Jamison's Est., 36 D. & C. 37 (Phila. Co.)-because
other apt remedies were available.
On questions of right to invest in stocks. Carwithen's Est., 327 Pa. 490, rev'g 28 D. &
C. 66 and Donovan's Est., 327 Pa. 496, rev'g 28 D. & C. 93, both from Philadelphia County.
22Duff's Est., 4 D. & C. 315.
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in our jurisprudence, as heretofore it has always been considered
requisite in our legal procedure that the courts should be calltd
upon to decide only those questions which arise in actual litigation. The legislature, however, in its last session, has adopted
this Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which follows similar
procedure or identical acts in some foreign jurisdictions and in
several states of this Union. And we note that in sections 12 and
15 the legislature, having declared its purpose to be remedial, has
enjoined the courts to construe and administer the act liberally and
to interpret and construe it so as to effectuate its general purpose
viz., to make uniform the law of those states which enact it and'
harmonize, as far as possible, with Federal laws and regulations
on the subject of declaratory judgments. How far this latter injunction may be within the province of the legislature we need
not consider at the present time, but we may remark it is difficulo
to see why, in matters of legal procedure, it is desirable for us
to assimilate the practice in Pennsylvania to that of Kansas or
Florida, however appropriate such uniformity may be with respect
to negotiable instruments, warehouse receipts and the like. For
some purposes it may be desirable to dress in ready-made uniforms,
but it is better for most men to be measured for their clothing
and have their coats cut to suit their individual requirements.
"We deem it proper in this, the first case presented to us
under this new statute, to consider its provisions somewhat at
length. From our examination, we are of opinion, in the first
place, that the act is clearly not intended to permit, much less
require, the courts to answer abstract propositions of law or moot
questions which are merely academic. This much appears to be
conceded by every one. Nor do we think that it is intended to
confer on the courts that jurisdiction to advise fiduciaries in the
discharge of their duties, which, although it may obtain in some
states, has never been allowed in Pennsylvania. A mere advisory
opinion upon an abstract question is obviously not a judgment at
all. The act contemplates the solution of a real controversy between adverse parties. In the third place, we are of opinion that
the act, which is professedly remedial, should not be held to operate where the evil intended to be remedied does not exist.
*

0

*

,

"In the fourth place, and this particularly affects our decision of the present case, we are of opinion that the act was not
intended to extend or in any wise affect the jurisdiction of this
court so as to bring within it cases or a class of cases not previously cognizable here. In the very first line of its 1st section
the act distinctly refers to the respective jurisdictions of the courts,
and there is nothing whatever in any section of it to confer any
jurisdiction on the Orphans' Court which previously belonged
to the Common Pleas, and, indeed, if there Were, this act would
be unconstitutional, inasmuch as its title would be defective."
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Argument in favor of the act in appropriate proceedings was soon to
follow:23
"No doubt many other instances could be cited where we
in Pennsylvania are today, and have been for many years, indulging
in declaratory judgments; the present legislation simply makes
that practice more extensive. When this latter fact is realized,
the whole argument as to the act's imposing on the courts something new, in the nature of a nonjudicial function, fails; for the
statute before us merely presents the extension of a long and well
established judicial function, previously enjoyed to a considerable
extent in this State, of declaring the law which governs a given
condition of facts so as to make the controversy covered by these
facts rer judicata, albeit in many cases no execution may be called
for, and even though the action was started before damages were
actually inflicted or before danger thereof was imminent."
But the limitations were clearly defined in that:
"a proceeding to obtain such a judgment will not be entertained
where the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter involved
* * *;or where another statutory remedy has been specially provided for the character of case in hand * * *;and that jurisdiction
will never be assumed unless the tribunal appealed to is satisfied
that an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one, exists between parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and
that the declaration sought will be a practical help in ending the
controversy: * * * Moreover, in a declaratory judgment proceeding
the court will not decide future rights in anticipation of an event
which may not happen, but, just as in the ordinary executory action, it will wait until the event actually takes place, unless special
circumstances appear which warrant an immediate decision, as, for
instance, where present rights depend on the declaration sought by
plaintiff; and even then such rights will not be determined unless
all parties concerned in their adjudication are present and ready
to proceed with the case (see section 11, of the act), so that the
judgment rendered will make the issues involved res judicata in the
full sense of that term * * *
"In our opinion the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a
constitutional piece of legislation, which, within proper limits, can
be mad-e of real use." (Emphasis supplied.)
Regardless, however, of the very evident intent of the legislature, the genthe courts has coincided with that of Stewart,
eral opinion in the majority of
24
P.J. of Northampton County:
"It is our personal hope that if the act is held to be constitutional, the higher courts will enjoin upon courts not to take jurisdiction under it except in very plain cases."
23Moschzisker, C. J. in Kariher's Pet'n. (No. 1). 284 Pa. 455 (1925).
24
1n Wilhelm's Est., 19 North. 378 (1924).

22
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That opinion on the subject is still deeply divided has been but recently,
25
demonstrated.
Time alone will determine the length to which the courts will go in accepting jurisdiction under the exigencies of circumstances pressed upon them by
counsel on behalf of litigants in quest of relief. As in the past, it will n4
doubt depend on the individual predilections of the judge of first instance.
Having in mind the present scope of the jurisdiction of the Orphans'
Court thus reviewed, it would seem reasonable to believe that no further attempt
will be made to enlarge the field of its duties though, in its continued advance
from a position of lowly confusion to one of extreme importance, we can but
hope that every occasion will be taken to broaden and more clearly define its
jurisdiction.
Philadelphia, Pa.

R. M.

REMICK

Oct. 15, 1942
25
1n Moore v. Moore, 344 Pa. 324 (Jan. 29, 1942) where the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County was reversed in refusing jurisdiction. Opinion by Schaffer, C.J. Dissenting
opinion, by J.J. Maxey and Drew.

